On the temporal orientation of intensional subjunctives in Spanish.*

According to a distinction originally due to Stowell (1993) and subsequently exploited by Quer (1998, 2006), “intensional subjunctives” – as opposed to “polarity subjunctives” - are lexically selected by a semantic class of matrix predicates which also impose a particular temporal orientation on their argument clauses. Careful examination of the licit temporal configurations for subjunctive clauses in Spanish shows, however, that intensional subjunctives do not conform to a homogeneous pattern: in particular, the argument clauses of “volitionals” deviate in manifold ways from the expected temporal orientation and give rise in some cases to interpretive effects that parallel those found with modal verbs. In this paper, I explore the possibility of accounting for the behaviour of “volitionals” by exploiting their double nature as evaluative propositional attitudes and as dispositions to act (Kenny 1963, Heim 1992, Portner 1997).

1. Intensional versus polarity subjunctives

The distinction between intensional and polarity subjunctives is drawn on the basis of four properties (Quer 1998, 2006).¹ Intensional subjunctives, by contrast with polarity subjunctives, do not alternate with indicatives, as shown in (1a-b):

1

a. Quiere que te vayas/*vas.
   want.PR.IND.3.SG that you go.PR.SBJ.2SG./ go.PR.IND.2SG
   ‘S/he wants you to leave’

b. No cree que te vayas/ vas.
   not believe.PR.IND.3.SG that you go.PR.SBJ.2SG./ go.PR.IND.2SG

¹ As J. Guéron points out (p.c.), there is a fundamental unclarity in the distinction between “intensional” and “polarity” subjunctives. Following Quer (2006), I tend to assume that they constitute two different categories, which happen to share the same morphology in some languages. The fact that some languages exhibit intensional subjunctives, but entirely lack polarity subjunctives, while other languages distinguish morphologically between both types, provides some evidence for this split. As for Spanish, some evidence from language acquisition and language attrition seems to point in the same direction (Lozano 1995).
‘S/he does not believe that you are leaving’

Secondly, intensional subjonctives do not “spread” to further embedded argument clauses, whereas polarity subjonctives license multiple subjunctive embedding:

2

a. Quiere que digas que está/ *esté bien.
   want.PR.IND.3.SG that sayPR.SBJ.2SG that be.PR.IND.3.SG/be.PR.SBJ.3SG well
   ‘S/he wants you to say that it’s all right’

b. No cree que digas que está/ esté bien.
   not believe.PR.IND.3.SG that sayPR.SBJ.2SG that be.PR.IND.3.SG/be.PR.SBJ.3SG well
   ‘S/he does not believe that you (will) say that it’s all right’

Thirdly, intensional subjonctives give rise to subject obviation effects that are absent in the case of polarity subjonctives. Coreference between the matrix subject and the subject of the subjunctive clause is perfectly possible in the latter case, but seems excluded in the former:

3

a. *Tratamos de que lleguemos a tiempo.
   Try.PR.IND.1PL of that arrive.PR.SBJ.1PL on time
   *‘We are trying that we arrive on time’

b. No estamos seguros de que lleguemos a tiempo.
   not be.PR.IND.1PL sure of that arrive.PR.SBJ.1PL on time
   ‘We are not sure we will arrive on time’

Finally, the matrix predicates selecting for intensional subjonctives impose a particular temporal orientation on their argument clauses, which is not matched in the case of polarity subjonctives. This temporal orientation is variously described as future or non-anterior, and is usually illustrated by the fact that intensional subjonctives may not exhibit past morphology if the matrix verb is in a present tense (4a), whereas this temporal configuration is licit in the case of polarity subjonctives (4b) (see Suñer 1990, Suñer & Padilla Rivera 1987/1990):

4

a. *Exijo que estuviera en casa.
   demand.PR.IND.1SG that be.IMPF.SBJ.3SG at home
   *‘I demand that s/he was at home’

b. No creo que estuviera en casa.
   not believe.PR.IND.1SG that be.IMPF.SBJ.3SG at home
   ‘I don’t think s/he was at home’

The first two properties are quite robust, and they follow naturally from the assumption that intensional subjonctives are selected by their matrix verbs. The third and fourth properties, by contrast, are less robust: they are known to vary in subtle ways according
to several factors (Quer 1998, 2006). However, little attention has been devoted to the semantics of the matrix verbs as a factor in this variation. In this paper, I will concentrate on the fourth property, trying to arrive at an explanation of the different patterns of temporal orientation that hold for different types of matrix verbs.2

2. The temporal orientation of matrix verbs selecting intensional subjunctives

According to Quer (1998), matrix verbs selecting for intensional subjunctives fall into three main classes:

(a) **Directives**, like *exigir* ‘require’, *ordenar* ‘order’, *pedir* ‘ask’, *permitir* ‘allow’ are primarily speech-act verbs that perform or report directive or permissive speech acts; some of them may be used – in particular with inanimate subjects – to express various flavours of non-epistemic necessity or possibility.

(b) **Causatives** comprise positive and negative causation verbs, like *dejar* ‘let’, *hacer* ‘make’, *impedir* ‘prevent’, *obligar* ‘force’ and other verbs showing obligatory object-control, as well as verbs of the try/manage type. Most of them, but by far not all, are implicative or neg-implicative verbs.3

(c) **Volitionals** form a large and, as we will see, quite heterogenous class of verbs, which is probably best captured by Kenny’s notion of *Volition*, reporting “the taking up of an attitude of approval to a state of affairs”:4

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2 J. Guéron (p.c.) reminds me of an example originally proposed by Nicolas Ruwet (see Quer 2006 for further references) that might show some degree of correlation between the third and fourth properties. In fact, obviation effects disappear in the French sentence *je voudrais que je sois enterré dans mon pays natal* ‘I would like it for me to be buried in my native country’, in which the matrix verb carries conditional morphology. However, the factors influencing obviation effects are complex and poorly described for Spanish, so that an examination of this correlation must be left for further research.

3 Implicative verbs entail their argument clause, and their negation entails the falsity of the argument clause (Karttunen 1971). The fact that they take the subjunctive constitutes a serious problem for any account of the subjunctive based on non-factuality or non-veridicality. Neg-implicative verbs, by contrast, entail the falsity of their argument clause.

4 The quotation shows that Kenny also includes “attitudes of disapproval” in this class. I will only exemplify positive attitudes in this paper, but it is easy to provide an analysis of their (negative polarity) antonyms (sometimes called ‘adversatives’) by reversing the orderings in the semantic definitions quoted below. As for the inclusion of emotive/evaluative-factives in the class, its motivation will be discussed below, but – for the sake of clarity – I will not adopt Kenny’s proposal of calling them ‘volitionals’. 
‘The Volition that $p$ will be something that is common to hoping that $p$, wanting it to be the case that $p$, wishing, intending to bring it about, being ashamed that not, fearing that not $p$,..., and which is absent from merely judging that $p$, knowing that $p$, being certain that $p$, expecting that $p$” (Kenny 1963, ++) 

The argument clauses of such matrix verbs share a hitherto unnoticed distributional property: they cannot host prospective aspect which is expressed in Spanish by the verbal periphrasis *ir ‘go’ + a ‘to’ + Infinitive (roughly corresponding to the *be-going-to-*construction in English):

5. a. *Exige que el artículo vaya a tener veinte páginas.*
   demand.PR.IND.3SG that the paper go.PR.SBJ.3SG to have twenty pages
   *’S/he demands that the paper be going to be twenty pages long’

   b. *Hizo que el artículo fuera a tener veinte páginas.*
   make.SP.IND.3SG that the paper go.IMPF.SBJ.3SG to have twenty pages
   *’S/he got the paper to be going to be twenty pages long’

   c. *Quiero que el artículo vaya a tener veinte páginas*
   want.PR.IND.1SG that the paper go.PR.SBJ.3SG to have twenty pages
   *’I want the paper to be going to be twenty pages long’

Prospective aspect is, by contrast, perfectly acceptable in the case of polarity subjunctives: 5

6. a. *No creo que el artículo vaya a tener veinte páginas.*
   not.believe.PR.IND.1SG that the paper go.PR.SBJ.3SG to have twenty pages
   ‘I don’t think the paper is going to be twenty pages long’

   b. *Poca gente piensa que el gobierno vaya a tener éxito.*
   Few people think.PR.IND.3SG that the government go.PR.SBJ.3SG to have success
   ‘Few people believe that the government is going to have any success’

It is tempting to interpret the incompatibility of intensional subjunctives with prospective aspect as an indication of a future temporal orientation imposed by the matrix verbs. In fact, prospective aspect is disallowed under future tense, and it is also disallowed in the infinitival complements of future-oriented verbs, as for instance

5 When at all possible, prospective aspect with matrix verbs selecting intensional subjunctives is only licensed in polarity contexts, i.e. we have a curious situation in which subjunctive mood itself is selected by the matrix verb, but the prospective subjunctive behaves as a polarity item:

   (i) *No quiero que el artículo vaya a tener veinte páginas.*
   not.want.PR.IND.1SG that the paper go.PR.SBJ.3SG to have twenty pages
   ‘I don’t want the article to be twenty pages long’

   (ii) *Poca gente espera que el gobierno vaya a tener éxito.*
   few people hope.PR.IND.3SG that the government go.PR.SBJ.3SG to have success
   ‘Few people hope for the government to succeed’
prometer:6

the government go.FUT.IND.3SG to have success
*’The government will be going to succeed’
b. *El gobierno promete ir a tener éxito.
the government promise.PR.IND.3SG to go to have success
*’The government promises to be going to succeed’

The second temporally relevant property that intensional subjunctives share is the possibility of exhibiting present-tense morphology under a matrix past tense. This phenomenon is more widely attested in American Spanish varieties, but is not entirely absent in European Spanish:7

8. a. Les aconsejó que actúen dentro de la legalidad.
them advise.SP.IND.3SG that act.PR.SBJ.3SG inside of the law
’S/he advised them to act according to the law’
b. Se logró que ambas aerolíneas operen.PR.SBJ.3PL con máxima rentabilidad.
REFL manage.SP.IND.3SG that both airlines operate with maximal profit.
’We succeeded in getting both airlines operate with top profits’
c. ¿Quería Greenpeace que se hable del Banco Mundial?
want.IMPF.IND.3SG Greenpeace that REFL talk.PR.SBJ.3SG of+the Bank World
’Did Greenpeace want for the World Bank to become a central topic?’

Such temporal configurations give rise to double access effects, in which the time of the embedded clause is anchored both to the time of the matrix clause (T\text{MATRIX}) and to Utterance-Time (UTT-T). Temporal orientation with regard to UTT-T is simultaneous or posterior, according to a well-known pattern of temporal-structure-driven interpretation: statives (including habituals and progressives) give rise to simultaneity, whereas eventives not allowing a progressive or a habitual interpretation are forward-shifted. Temporal orientation with regard to T\text{MATRIX} is posterior, which seems to provide a further indication that the matrix verbs induce a future temporal orientation.

However, the temporal uniformity of the three classes of environments -and with it the possibility of attributing future temporal orientation to subjunctive-selecting matrix verbs- breaks down when retrospective/perfect aspect is taken into account.

\footnote{6}{On the complex matter of verbs imposing a future orientation on infinitival complements, see Abusch (2004) and Katz (2004).}
\footnote{7}{In some American Spanish varieties, this phenomenon seems to be affecting the deictic nature of the present subjunctive, as witnessed by the possible lack of double access effects. See Sessarego (2008a,b) and Laca (2009) for discussion.}
Retrospective aspect is expressed in Spanish by the compound forms of finite or infinite verbal forms, which are built with *haber* ‘have’ + *Past Participle*. In embedded clauses, the anteriority relation it contributes can be anchored to Tmatrix (under conditions to be discussed below), thus giving rise to configurations with a past temporal orientation, in which the time of the embedded event description precedes Tmatrix. The presence of future oriented adverbials or temporal clauses, however, gives rise to future-perfect readings: the result state of the embedded event description is said to hold at the (future) time denoted by the adverbial, and the ensuing temporal orientation need not be past with regard to Tmatrix, since the time of the embedded event description may follow Tmatrix.8

The complement clauses of directives and causatives may host retrospective aspect, but only in the presence of future oriented adverbials or temporal clauses that ensure future-perfect readings, and thus the possibility of a non-past temporal orientation:

9. a. *Pide que hayamos completado el informe *(para el jueves/*ask.PR.IND.3SG that have.PRSBJ.1.PL completed the report for the thursday (para) cuando vuelva).*
   *for when return.PRSBJ.3SG ‘S/he demands for us to have completed the report by Thursday/by the time s/he comes back’*
   b. *Consiguió que hubieran completado el informe *(para el jueves).*
   *manage.SP.IND.3SG that have.IMPF.SBJ.3PL completed the report for the thursday ‘S/he managed to get them complete the report by Thursday’*

Directives and causatives pattern in this respect like verbs imposing a future orientation on the infinitival clauses they embed:

10. a. *Promete haber completado el informe *(para el jueves).*
    *promise.PR.IND.3SG have completed the report for the thursday ‘S/he promises to have completed the report by Thursday’*

By contrast, volitionals diverge from this pattern, and this in ways that reveal the lack of homogeneity of this class of verbs. There is one volitional, *querer* ‘want’, whose behavior is close to that of directives and causatives with regard to retrospective aspect.9

8 On the analysis of future perfect readings as resultatives, see Demirdache & Uribe-Etxeberria (2008)

9 Other verbs showing the same behavior are *anhelar* ‘long for’, *apetecer* ‘feel like’, *pretender* ‘pretend’. They are even more clearly future-oriented than *querer*, since conditional
rest, however, admit retrospective aspect also in configurations which cannot but induce a past temporal orientation

11. a. Quiere que hayamos completado el informe *(para el jueves/(para) cuando vuelva) 
   want.PR.IND.3SG that have.PR.SBJ.1.PL completed the report for the thursday 
   for when return.PR.SBJ.3SG 
   ‘S/he wants us to have completed the report by Thursday/ by the time she comes back’
   b. *Quiere que Pedro se haya instalado en Madrid. 
   want.PR.IND.3SG that Pedro REFL have.PR.SBJ.3.SG settled in Madrid.
   *‘S/he wants Pedro to have settled in Madrid’

12. a. ?Desea que Pedro se haya instalado en Madrid. 
   wish.PR.IND.3SG that Pedro REFL have.PR.SBJ.3.SG settled in Madrid 
   b. Espera que Pedro se haya instalado en Madrid. 
   hope.PR.IND.3SG that Pedro REFL have.PR.SBJ.3.SG settled in Madrid 
   c. Prefiere que Pedro se haya instalado en Madrid. 
   prefer.PR.IND.3SG that Pedro REFL have.PR.SBJ.3.SG settled in Madrid
   ‘S/he wishes/ hopes/ prefers for Pedro to have settled in Madrid’

   The temporal orientation of volitionals shows the same paradox that is well-known for modals. Modals are usually held to be forward-shifting environments (Enç 1996, Condoravdi 2001), and in fact, Spanish modals share with future-oriented contexts the impossibility of hosting prospective aspect:

   the paper must/may go to have twenty pages
   *‘The paper must/may be going to be twenty pages long’

In spite of their putative forward-shifting nature, modals can also embed perfect infinitives that give rise to past temporal orientation:

   ‘Pedro must/may have settled in Madrid.’

In such configurations, modals acquire an epistemic interpretation: the issue whether Pedro has settled or not in Madrid is decided at $\text{UTT} \cdot \text{T}$, but the speaker does not know in which way it has been decided. An analogous condition holds for the felicitous use of volitionals such as desear, esperar embedding argument clauses with a past temporal orientation: sentences (12a-b) convey that the subject of the attitude does not know

morphology does not license past orientation in these cases.
whether Pedro has settled in Madrid or not. Laca (2009) suggests that volitionals are subject to the same diversity constraint on modal bases that is operative in the case of modals: the modal base providing the background for interpretation should contain both worlds of which the embedded proposition holds and worlds of which it does not hold (Condoravdi 2001, Werner 2003). Since propositions with a past temporal orientation are decided at the time of evaluation, only epistemic uncertainty warrants diversity in such cases. This does not extend, however, to a verb like preferir, since (12c) is perfectly felicitous in a situation in which the subject of the attitude believes Pedro to have settled in Madrid. In this situation, sentences with preferir are very close in meaning to sentences containing evaluative-factives.

The parallelism between (some) volitionals and modals goes further. It is well known that the temporal orientation of modals embedding simple infinitives varies according to the temporal structure (Vendlerian class) of the described situation. In English, simple eventive infinitives give rise to forward-shifting, whereas stative infinitives can give rise to simultaneous or to forward-shifted interpretations. Forward-shifting correlates with deontic flavours of modality, whereas simultaneity correlates with epistemic readings, as illustrated by the two possible interpretations of (15):

15. The article must be twenty pages long.
   (i) It is required that the article be twenty pages long.
   (ii) It is inferrable that the article is twenty pages long.

An analogous pattern holds for those volitionals that are compatible with a past orientation: embedded stative descriptions can give rise to simultaneous or to forward-shifted readings, and simultaneous readings convey epistemic uncertainty:

   ‘Pedro wishes/ hopes for María to be already in Madrid’

   b. Pedro desea/espera que María esté en Madrid mañana.
   ‘Pedro wishes/ hopes for María to be in Madrid tomorrow’

By contrast, querer patterns like directionals and causatives, in as far as it rules out a simultaneous temporal orientation:

17. a. *Pedro quiere que María esté ya en Madrid.
Pedro wants that María be.PR.SBJ.3SG already in Madrid
‘Pedro wants Maria to be already in Madrid’
b. *Pedro ordena que María esté ya en Madrid.
   Pedro orders that María be.PR.SBJ.3SG already in Madrid
   *‘Pedro commands that Maria (should) be already in Madrid’
c. *Pedro trata de que María esté ya en Madrid.
   Pedro tries of that María be.PR.SBJ.3SG already in Madrid
   *‘Pedro is trying for Maria to be already in Madrid’

Conditional morphology on querer, however, renders possible both a past and a simultaneous temporal orientation, which are still ruled out for directionals and causatives:

18. a. Pedro querría que María se hubiera instalado en Madrid.
   Pedro want.COND that María REFLECT have.IMPF.SBJ.3SG settled in Madrid
   ‘Pedro would like Maria to have settled in Madrid’
b. Pedro querría que María estuviera ya en Madrid.
   Pedro want.COND that María be.PR.SBJ.3SG already in Madrid
   ‘Pedro would like it for Maria to be already in Madrid’
c. *Pedro ordenaría que María se hubiera instalado en Madrid.
   Pedro order.COND that María REFLECT have.IMPF.SBJ.3SG settled in Madrid
   *‘Pedro would order that Maria (should) have settled in Madrid’

In the presence of conditional morphology and with a past temporal orientation, volitionals show a further similarity with modals: they give rise to two construals, a construal involving epistemic uncertainty and a counterfactual construal. Thus, (18a), reproduced as (19), admits the two continuations (i) and (ii), which are also possible for the modal in (20).

19 Pedro querría que María se hubiera instalado en Madrid.
(i) pero no sabe si lo ha hecho o no.
   ‘but he doesn’t know whether or not she has’
(ii) y lamenta que se haya decidido por Barcelona.
   ‘and he regrets that she should have chosen Barcelona’

20 María debería haberse instalado en Madrid.
   María must.COND have-REFLECT settled in Madrid
   ‘Maria should have settled in Madrid’
(i) ¿Sabes si lo ha hecho?
   ‘Do you know if she has?’
(ii) pero se decidió por Barcelona.
   but she chose Barcelona.
Both construals share two properties: (i) the truth value of the argument clause of volitionals or, respectively, of the prejacent proposition in the case of modals, is seen as decided at \textit{UtT-T} and (ii) they are felicitous in contexts in which the falsity of this propositional content is entertained. The construals differ only as to the knowledge-state attributed to the bearer of the attitude in the case of volitionals, or to the speaker in the case of (unembedded) modals. By contrast with other approaches, I do not assume that the difference between epistemic uncertainty and the certainty of falsehood amounts to a genuine ambiguity in such cases.

The phenomena discussed in this section give rise to the following questions:

(i) what is the difference between directives and causatives, on the one hand, which show a uniform future temporal orientation, and volitionals and modals, on the other hand, which show some symptoms of future temporal orientation but are nonetheless compatible with a past temporal orientation?

(ii) what are the roots of the epistemic uncertainty felicity condition that holds for modals and for (most) volitionals in configurations imposing a simultaneous or a past temporal orientation, and thus conveying that the issue is decided at \textit{UtT-T}?

(iii) why is epistemic uncertainty as to a past issue not enough for licensing a past temporal orientation for a verb like \textit{querer}? Why does conditional morphology in this case, but not in the case of directives or causatives, lift the ban against past temporal orientation?

3. The semantics of volitionals

The formal semantics literature offers two concurrent approaches to the semantics of volitionals. Volitionals can be treated on a par with propositional attitude verbs, or they can be distinguished from them. The difference hinges on the type of semantic object that the argument clause of the volitional is assumed to denote.

In Heim’s classic treatment of the semantics of attitude verbs (Heim 1992), the argument clause of a volitional is a proposition. However, the volitional does not express universal quantification over a set of accessible worlds corresponding to a bouletic modal base (the set of worlds compatible with the desires of the attitude bearer), as in the Hintikkian tradition, but orders the doxastic alternatives of the attitude bearer (i.e.
the set of worlds compatible with his or her beliefs), ranking worlds that verify the proposition expressed in the argument clause higher than worlds that do not verify it:

21 ‘α wants φ’ is true in w iff
for every w′ ∈ Dox_α (w):
every φ-world maximally similar to w’ is more desirable to α in w than any non-φ-world maximally similar to w’ (Heim 1992: 193)

In the Kratzerian double-background approach to modality, this would amount to the combination of a doxastic modal base with a bouletic ordering source. Recall now that Laca (2009) assumed that a diversity condition on modal bases is responsible for the readings of epistemic uncertainty that arise for volitionals and modals alike when the issue of the truth of the associated proposition is decided at UTT-T. In Heim’s framework, a similar condition is captured by the assumption that volitionals carry a presupposition according to which the bearer of the attitude neither believes φ nor non-φ (Heim 1992: 198). This presupposition ensures that the modal base Dox_α (w) contains both φ- and non-φ-worlds, 10 and is necessary in order to avoid situations in which one of the set of worlds being ranked should be the empty set. If there were no φ-worlds (or no non-φ-worlds) in the modal base, universal quantification restricted by the empty set would give rise to vacuous truth. I will refer to this property by saying that the modal base is φ-diverse. Note that this presupposition provides an answer to question (ii) above by establishing a necessary link between φ-diversity and comparative ordering of worlds. A similar motivation for φ-diversity in the case of modals has been advanced by Werner (2003), who links it to the assumption that the interpretation of modals always involves an ordering source, and to the vacuousness of ordering which would result from lack of φ-diversity.

Heim extends her semantics for volitionals in a way that elegantly captures the whole class of volitionals adumbrated by Kenny (1963), including most notably counterfactual desire reports and factive predicates expressing an attitude of approval. This is done in a single move, by supposing that in both cases, the doxastic modal base is

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10 As far as volitionals are concerned, the intuition as to the necessity of doxastic φ-diversity is widespread, and is also found in Hintikkian treatments of volitionals, which do not rely on ordering of alternatives. Thus, Zimmermann (2006) formulates a bridge axiom relating epistemic and bouletic modality which has the effect of ensuring that uncertainty as to p follows from the desire of wanting p to hold.
minimally revised in order to admit the relevant worlds not included in the actual doxastic alternatives of the bearer of the attitude: the $\phi$-worlds, which are ranked higher in the case of counterfactual wishes, and, respectively, the non-$\phi$-worlds, which are ranked lower in the case of positive evaluative factives.

22. ‘$\alpha$ wishes $\phi$’ is true in $w$ iff
   for every $w' \in \text{rev}_\phi (\text{Dox}_\alpha (w))$:
   every $\phi$-world maximally similar to $w'$ is more desirable to $\alpha$ in $w$ than any non-$\phi$-world maximally similar to $w'$

23. ‘$\alpha$ is glad that $\phi$’ is true in $w$ iff
   for every $w' \in \text{rev} \neg \phi (\text{Dox}_\alpha (w))$:
   every $\phi$-world maximally similar to $w'$ is more desirable to $\alpha$ in $w$ than any non-$\phi$-world maximally similar to $w'$

In this account, want, wish (when embedding an irrealis complement) and be glad share a core evaluative semantics that ranks the (most similar) worlds verifying the argument clause higher than those not verifying it. They differ as to the characteristics of the doxastic modal base, which is $\phi$-diverse in the case of want, incompatible with $\phi$ in the case of wish, and incompatible with non-$\phi$ in the case of be glad. Note that the felicity condition imposing epistemic uncertainty for a volitional whose argument clause makes reference to a decided issue is built into the requirement of $\phi$-diversity for the modal base: certainty as to $\phi$ or to non-$\phi$ should be expressed respectively by a factive or by a counterfactual, whose interpretation relies on revisions of the original modal base.

This unification of volitionals with evaluative-factives sets Kenny’s intuitions as to what statements and reports of desires convey on an explicit basis (see also Farkas 2003). It seems all the more convincing in the light of the fact that in the presence of conditional morphology11, sentences containing evaluative-factives are very close in meaning to sentences containing volitionals:

24. a. Peter wishes that Mary had settled in Madrid.
   b. Peter would have liked it for Mary to settle in Madrid.

However, this account does not explain the curious behaviour of querer, which, as discussed in the previous section, does not allow a past temporal orientation. This

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11 I will assume for the purposes of this discussion that wish is to be analysed as want + conditional morphology (Iatridou & von Fintel 2008).
property also extends to want, as attested by the unacceptability of (25), and it is entirely unexpected in the light of definition (21) above, since the definition only requires uncertainty of the bearer of the attitude as to Mary's having settled or not in Madrid:

25. Peter wants Mary to have settled in Madrid *(by next week)*

Portner (1997) offers a suggestive alternative account of volitionals, in which not all argument clauses denote the same type of object. Key to the difference between these types of object is the distinction between propositions as sets of possible worlds and propositions as sets of situations. Whereas possible worlds are complete specifications of entire world-histories, situations are smaller spatiotemporal parts of possible worlds. Since situations are ordered by the part-of relation, possible worlds can be conceived of as maximal situations. Propositions are modeled as set of situations, and a proposition is said to be persistent iff it contains every supersituation in it. For persistent propositions, it is always possible to recover a set of possible worlds from a set of situations However, Portner assumes that some propositions are not persistent. In particular, the propositions denoted by imperatives, as well as by infinitives and subjunctives embedded under directives, are sets of situations that do not extend to whole world histories, precisely because of their future orientation: the situations involved start after the reference situation, which is the utterance situation in unembedded contexts, and the embedding situation denoted by the matrix clause in embedded contexts. I will follow Ginzburg and Sag (2001) in referring to those non-persistent, inherently future-oriented propositions as outcomes.

In this setup, the future orientation of directives is part of their definition: it follows from the type of semantic object that directives select for. Since outcomes are not propositions as sets of possible worlds, truth or falsity do not apply to them. By contrast, outcomes can be fulfilled or not, according to the existence or not in the world of evaluation of a situation starting after the reference situation that supports the description of the outcome:

26. a. John said that Mary would arrive early, and what he said is true.
   b. John told Mary to arrive early, and what he said ??is true/ was fulfilled.

I believe that this account can be extended to causatives, which would also take
outcomes as arguments. Since the vast majority of causatives are implicative, they entail the fulfilment of their complement.\(^{12}\)

Turning back to volitionals, Portner’s account opens the possibility of treating them both as propositional attitudes and as outcome-embedding predicates. The difference hinges on the way bouletic alternatives are defined. In the first case, bouletic alternatives are sets of worlds, as expressed in (27):

27. For any situation \(s\), \(Bl_\alpha (s) = \{w : w \in Dox_\alpha (s) \text{ and } w \text{ satisfies } \alpha 's \text{ desires in } s \text{ at least as well as any other world in } Dox_\alpha (s)\}\)

In the second case, bouletic alternatives are modeled in terms of fulfilling plans for action. Plans are conceived of as possible situations “which follow the agent through a course of actions that ultimately results in the desired state”. The “desired state” is described by a non-persistent proposition, an outcome, since it is a part of a situation (the plan) that starts after the reference situation and does not extend backwards in time. Portner (1997) explicitly assumes that the infinitival complement of \(\text{want}\) denotes a non-persistent proposition. Note that this assumption offers a straightforward explanation for the ban on a past temporal orientation in the case of \(\text{want}\): an outcome cannot precede its reference situation.

I propose to build on Portner’s suggestion by distinguishing volitionals that convey evaluations, and take propositions as their complements, from volitionals that convey dispositions for action, and take outcomes as their complements. The latter, but not the former, will be confined to the same temporal configurations that are legitimate for directives and causatives.

4. The heterogeneity of volitionals

Some volitionals clearly embed proposition-like objects, as shown by the fact that, like

\(^{12}\) The fact that implicative verbs take the subjunctive constitutes a major problem for all accounts of subjunctive selection based on the notion of non-veridicality (see Quer 1998). Relating causatives to outcomes seems a more natural move than appealing, as Quer does (1998, Chapt. 2, section 5.3), to the “non-veridical epistemic model representing future realizations of the world according to the main subject”. Quer’s proposal fails to account for non-animate causative subjects, which cannot possibly introduce epistemic models:

(i) \(\text{El buen tiempo hizo/ contribuyó a/ ayudó a que } \text{la fiesta fuera } \text{un éxito.}\)

The fine weather made/contributed to/helped to that the party be.IMPF.SBJ. a success

‘The fine weather contributed to the success of the party’
assertion and belief predicates, they can embed yes/no-answers to a question (Falaus 2009):

28.  

[¿Van a invitar a Juan?]

‘Are they going to invite Juan?’

a. Pedro cree/ dice que no.

Pedro believes/says that no.

‘Pedro believes/ says they aren’t’

b. Espero/Prefiero que no.

I hope/ I prefer that no.

‘I hope not/ I’d rather they wouldn’t’

c. *Deseo/*Quiero que no.

I wish / I want that no

‘I wish/want not’

In fact, esperar does not even comply with the initial formulation of the ban on past temporal orientation for volitionals, since it allows for past subjunctives embedded under a non-past matrix verb:

29. Espero que estuviera en Madrid ayer.

Hope.PR.IND.1SG that be.IMPF.SBJ. in Madrid yesterday.

‘I hope s/he was in Madrid yesterday’

Esperar is actually an epistemic verb with a presupposed positive evaluation, and not a volitional. By contrast with the other volitionals, the positive evaluation is maintained under negative or interrogative operators, which only take the belief component in their scope. As shown by the examples (30a-b) below, one can mistakenly hope, but not wish, for something. The epistemic nature of esperar is further substantiated by the fact that, in Spanish, it is the only volitional which also allows for indicative complement clauses.

30. a. ¿Esperas que te paguen por esto? Pues te equivocas, no te pagarán.

Do you hope to be paid for this? Well, you’re wrong, they won’t.

b. ¿Deseas que te paguen por esto? #Pues te equivocas, no te pagarán.

Do you wish to be paid for this? #Well, you’re wrong, they won’t.

As for preferir, recall that it is not subject to the epistemic uncertainty felicity condition that hold for the other volitionals. Preferir ranks an alternative higher than other alternatives and thus corresponds exactly to the comparative, scalar semantics for

---

13 Note that in French, espérer selects for the indicative, and in English, hope takes indicative that-clauses.
volitionals developed by Villalta (2008) on the basis of Heim’s foundational work.\(^{14}\) Preferir is in itself not sensitive to the characteristics of the doxastic modal base, i.e. it does not care if the modal base is \(\phi\)-diverse, incompatible with non-\(\phi\), or incompatible with \(\phi\). The fact that in the latter, counterfactual case, preferir must necessarily bear conditional morphology, is a consequence of a more general principle regulating mood distribution to which we turn below.

On the other extreme, the parallelism between the temporal configurations that are licensed by querer and those that are licensed by directives and causatives indicates that querer primarily selects for outcomes. Recall, however, that this parallelism breaks down when querer bears conditional morphology: in such cases, a past temporal orientation becomes possible for querer, but remains excluded for directives and causatives. A closer look at the expression of idle and impossible wishes might help understand what is at stake.

In developing an account of desires in terms of plans for action, Portner (1997) was aware of the difficulty posed by impossible wishes. In his own words:

“Treating desire in terms of fulfilling plans seems to entail that one can only want what one gets in some belief world. Though this may be true as a default, it is certainly possible to want things which one believes to be impossible. The solution, suggested by Stalnaker (1987), is to allow the use of a background set of alternatives other than the agent’s doxastic set \(\text{Dox}_\alpha\)” (Portner 1997: 176)

I would like to suggest, firstly, that revising a set of doxastic alternatives in order to include a proposition that is incompatible with the relevant agent’s beliefs is always marked in Spanish by means of conditional morphology, and secondly, that under such a revision, bouletic alternatives are propositions (sets of possible worlds) and not outcomes. Unlike Portner, I do not think that all statements or reports of desires are to be treated alike: some of them report dispositions for action, others simply involve an

\(^{14}\) Villalta (2008) proposes an alternative-ranking semantics for all verbs selecting for subjunctive complements in Spanish. By contrast, I assume that this semantics only captures a small subset of volitionals.
evaluation.

As to the first claim, the contrast below shows that indicative morphology on *querer* attributes to the bearer of the attitude a belief as to the possibility of jumping to the moon, which is absent in the presence of conditional morphology:

32 a. *Pedro está loco: quiere llegar a la luna de un salto.*
   'Pedro is mad: he wants to jump to the moon'
b. *Pedro está loco: #querría llegar a la luna de un salto.*
   'Pedro is mad: he would like to jump to the moon'

Only the indicative desire can be taken as a symptom of insanity; the conditional desire simply reports an idle wish, the positive evaluation or higher ranking of φ-worlds which are not necessarily among the doxastic alternative of the agent.

As to the second claim, it can be indirectly substantiated by the fact that in the presence of conditional morphology, *querer* is very close in meaning to both *preferir* and to evaluative-factives, which do not select for outcomes, but for propositions:\(^{15}\)

33 a. *Querría que María estuviera en Madrid.*
   'I would like it for María to be in Madrid'
b. *Preferiría que María estuviera en Madrid.*
   'I’d prefer it for María to be in Madrid'
c. *Me gustaría que María estuviera en Madrid.*
   'I’d like it for María to be in Madrid'
d. *Me alegraría que María estuviera en Madrid.*
   'I would be happy if María were (to be) in Madrid'

This semantic similarity stems from the fact that conditional morphology alters the presuppositional nature of evaluative-factives, which do not presuppose in such contexts that the relevant agent believes the proposition expressed in their argument clause to be true. Note that none of the above examples are necessarily counterfactual: they are all felicitous in situations of epistemic uncertainty as to Mary’s whereabouts.

Interestingly enough, the temporal orientation of evaluative-factives also changes in such contexts. In fact, the temporal orientation of evaluative-factives is

\(^{15}\) I would like to thank Jean-Baptiste Guillon and Alexandre Cremmers for stimulating discussion on this point.
exactly the opposite to that of matrix verbs selecting for intensional subjunctives: they can embed prospective aspect, they enforce simultaneous interpretations with states, and they give rise to scheduled readings in contexts in which an episodic eventive forces forward-shifting, so that they are felt to be inadequate if the event in question is not amenable to scheduling:

34 a. *Me alegra que vayan a demoler ese edificio.*
   me rejoice.PR.IND.3SG. that go.PR.SBJ.3PL to tear down this building.
   ‘I’m glad they are going to tear down this building’
   b. *Me alegra que el artículo tenga veinte páginas.*
   me rejoice.PR.IND.3SG. that the paper have.PR.SBJ.3SG twenty pages
   ‘I’m glad the paper is twenty pages long’
   c. #*Me alegra que María gane la próxima carrera.*
   me rejoice.PR.IND.3SG. that Mary win.PR.SBJ.3SG the next race
   #‘I’m glad María wins/is winning the next race’

The reason for these temporal effects lies in factivity: the truth of the argument clause is presupposed to be settled at the time of evaluation. Only past and present facts, as well as scheduled future situations, fulfill the settledness presupposition. However, when the verb bears conditional morphology, forward-shifting of states becomes possible and scheduling effects disappear:

35 a. *Me alegraría que el artículo tuviera veinte páginas.*
   me rejoice.COND.3SG. that the paper have.IMPF.SBJ.3SG twenty pages
   ‘I’d be glad if the paper were (to be) twenty pages long’
   b. *Me alegraría que María ganara la próxima carrera.*
   me rejoice.COND.3SG. that Mary win.IMPF.SBJ.3SG the next race
   ‘I’d be glad if Mary were to win the next race’

Examples (35a-b) illustrate non-overtly licensed uses of conditional morphology. Following Laca (2007, 2009), I assume that conditional morphology is inherently anaphoric and is normally bound (a) by an embedding verb of assertion or belief in the past tense, giving rise to “future of the past” interpretations, or (b) by an irrealis antecedent, giving rise to modal interpretations (future-less-vivid or counterfactual conditional assertions). Non-overtly licensed conditional morphology is known to require the accommodation of a restriction corresponding to an irrealis antecedent, which is generally retrieved from material in the previous context (Corblin 2002: 255-261). However, in the case of modals, volitionals and evaluative-factives, a form of self-licensing seems to obtain, in as far as the interpretation need not rely on the previous
context. Kasper (1992) suggests that the interpretation of non-overtly licensed conditionals (which he calls *simple subjunctives*) can rely on unfulfilled ‘preconditions’ for the truth of the sentence: the missing restriction could be thus built from the presuppositions of the sentence itself. This account squares quite well with the fact that conditional morphology alters the presuppositional nature of evaluative-factives, but it explains neither why self-licensing is hardly possible with other presupposition triggers (see 36a-b), nor what the missing restriction could possibly be in the case of modals and volitionals.

36 a. 

\[\text{Pedro sabría que María ganó la carrera.}\]

Pedro know.COND that María win.SP.IND the race.

‘Pedro would know that María won the race’

b. 

\[\text{La orquesta dejaría de tocar.}\]

The band stop.COND of play

‘The band would stop playing’

What evaluative-factives, modals, and volitionals share is a ranking semantics, ordering some alternatives higher than others. This semantic component is entirely lacking in presupposition triggers like *know* or *stop*. I would like to suggest that self-licensing conditional morphology indicates that the highest ranking alternatives do not necessarily belong to the relevant doxastic modal base, which corresponds to the beliefs of the bearer of the attitude or to those of the speaker in the case of modals. With evaluative-factives, this indication has the immediate effect of suspending the presupposition as to the truth of the argument clause. With volitionals, it has the effect of suppressing the assumption as to the possibility of the complement clause. Note, furthermore, that the pseudo-volitional *esperar*, which does not assert a ranking of alternatives, does not give rise to self-licensing effects when bearing conditional morphology:

37 

\[\text{Pedro esperaría que María estuviera en Madrid.}\]

Pedro hope.COND that María be.IMPF.SBJ in Madrid

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16 Pesetsky (1991: 62) relies on a similar intuition when arguing that the paraphrase ‘John would like it if Mary knew French’ is the actual underlying representation of the sentence ‘John would like it if Mary knew French’. The *if*-clause would perform the double role of giving the content of the argument of *like* and acting as a counterfactual restriction.

17 The point is that these examples require accommodation from material in the previous context, and cannot be interpreted by building a counterfactual antecedent from the presupposition, i.e. as ‘If María had won the race, Pedro would know that she won the race’ or ‘If the band had been playing, it would stop playing’.
'Pedro would hope for Maria to be in Madrid'

Finally, with modals the effect is that of widening the modal base to include alternatives not entertained by the speaker. In fact, contradictory propositions can only be embedded by modals bearing conditional morphology, as shown in:

38  a. *Pedro podría/*puede no estar donde está.
    Pedro can.COND/can.PR.IND not be where is.
    ‘Pedro might not have been where he actually is’
    b. *Pedro no debería / no *debe haber hecho lo que hizo.
    Pedro not must.COND/not must.PR.IND have done what he did.
    ‘Pedro should not have done what he did’

If the line of reasoning we are suggesting is correct, conditional morphology would make in such contexts the same contribution it has been held to make in the case of counterfactual conditionals: that of widening the domain of alternatives in order to capture possibilities that might not be included in the relevant modal base (von Fintel 1997).

Table 1 summarizes some of the properties of the verbs discussed in this section:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Temporal orientatio n</th>
<th>Self-licensing of conditional morphology</th>
<th>Conditional morphology and past orientation</th>
<th>Diversity condition</th>
<th>Semantic type of the argument</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>causatives/directives</td>
<td>non-past</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>impossible</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>factive-evaluatives</td>
<td>non-future</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>not required</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>proposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>esperar</em> ‘hope’</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>not required</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>proposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>preferir</em> ‘prefer’</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>not required</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>outcome/ proposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>desear</em> ‘want-wish’</td>
<td>non-past</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>not required</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>outcome/ proposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>querer</em> ‘want’</td>
<td>non-past</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>required</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>outcome/ proposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>modals</td>
<td>?non-past</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>not required</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>outcome/ proposition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: An overview of the properties of predicates embedding intensional subjunctives and of modals

5. Conclusion and perspectives
The examination of the different patterns of temporal orientation affecting intensional subjunctives suggests that differences in temporal orientation are connected to the different types of semantic objects denoted by selected subjunctive argument clauses. An obligatory future or non-anterior orientation signals that the relevant object is not a proposition (a set of possible worlds), but an outcome (a situation or eventuality that ensues from a cause or is targeted by a disposition to bring it about). By contrast, lack of future orientation – as exhibited by evaluative-factives - is an indication that the relevant object is a fact (a proposition believed to be true by the bearer of the attitude). The puzzling behaviour of volitionals can be accounted for by assuming that they may be interpreted as dispositions to act, in which case the complement is construed as an outcome, or else they may carry the semantics of non-factive evaluatives, in which case the complement is construed as a proposition. Conditional morphology explicitly indicates widening of the domain of doxastic alternatives and contributes to blurring the difference between factive and non-factive-evaluatives.

When establishing the semantic class of volitionals, Kenny (1963) was keenly aware of their linguistic heterogeneity, and of the fact that some of them model their construction on that of reported commands, others on that of reported statements, and still others on that of counterfactual if-clauses. Unifying the class in terms of a ranking semantics for “attitudes of approval” was an undoubtedly important step in developing a semantics for attitude verbs, and in clarifying their relation to belief attitudes. But over and above the ranking semantics all volitionals share, the differences exhibited in their grammatical behaviour seem to be of greater logical importance than Kenny was prepared to admit.

One question that immediately arises in the light of the explanation suggested in this paper is that of the possible correspondence between semantic and syntactic objects: do “smaller” semantic objects, like outcomes, correspond to “simpler” syntactic objects, and correspondingly, do “bigger” semantic objects, like propositions, correspond to “more complex” syntactic objects? Such correspondences should be striven for, but attempts to define the relevant syntactic objects in terms of (surface) strings are doomed to failure. Thus, approaches trying to link the subjunctive/infinite/indicative alternance to different types of syntactic and semantic objects (see Rochette 1987) are faced with an unsurmountable difficulty: the heterogeneity of the class of verbs selecting for subjunctive/infinite complements. In the same vein,
attributing the same type of syntactic and semantic object (a futurate, non persistent proposition) to all occurrences of for-infinitives in English leads to the implausible conclusion that a sentence like I regret for you to have come all this way has a future orientation (Portner 1997). Only detailed attention to other possible syntactic correlates of the outcome/proposition distinction, which I can not develop in the limits of this paper, may give us the necessary clues as to the relevant syntax-semantics generalizations.

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