The puzzle I will address is illustrated in (1-3):

(1)  a. John finds this cake tasty.
     b. John finds the Dom Tower tall.
(2)  a. I find apples tastier than bananas.
     b. #I find John taller than Mary.
(3)  a. Apples are tasty for/to John.
     b. *The Dom Tower is tall for/to John.

(1) suggests that dimensional adjective (DA) tall is judge-dependent (according to one of the diagnostics), just like predicates of personal taste (PPTs), say, tasty or fun (Richard 2004; Anand 2009). (2) suggests that it’s not the DA itself that is judge-dependent, rather it’s its positive form, because comparative forms of DAs fail this test (2b) (Saebo 2009; Paenen 2011; Kennedy 2012). Moreover, (3) shows that the positive form of tall is not judge-dependent in exactly the same way as PPTs are: for example, it does not take an overt judge for/to-phrase. How can one account for the judge-dependence of tasty and tall in a way that would predict the contrasts in (2) and (3)?

The difference like (3), among some others, can be taken to motivate a ‘two kinds of subjectivity’ analysis, where PPTs take a judge argument (≈ contextualist analysis, see Lasersohn 2005, 2009), while positive DAs do not, rather having an interpretation dependent on the judge index of evaluation (≈ relativist analysis, see Stojanovic 2007) (this is compatible with the view described in Kennedy 2012):

(4)  a. [[tasty]]c; w, t, j = λx λy. y tastes good to x (in w at t)
     b. [[POS tall]]c; w, t, j = λx. height(x) > normj(height)

I broaden the range of facts to take into account in three ways: 1) I look at more classes of adjectives, adding to PPTs and DAs two more classes – evaluative adjectives like pretty, lazy and smart (Bierwisch 1989) and extreme adjectives like gigantic or enormous (Morzycki 2010); 2) I look at more constructions involving subjective elements – too-constructions, positive construction with modal standards (‘functional’ standards), comparative constructions with modal standards, and different ways to express a judge in all of them; 3) I look at a bit more languages – I discuss English, Japanese and Russian, especially their person restrictions on the judge (see also Moltmann 2010).

I won’t be able to account for all the data I discuss, but, further issues remaining, I will conclude that one doesn’t need to postulate two kinds of subjectivity. The issue of an extra argument is orthogonal to the issue of judge dependence. In particular, it’s not a coincidence that all the subjective predicates that have a judge-like argument are also experiencer predicates, while all the ‘relativist’-like subjective items do not involve reference to the perception experience, but in all other respects are as judge-dependent as the experiencer ones. Thus, the ‘judge’ argument of PPTs is not the judge argument, but rather an experiencer argument, and the relativist-like analysis of subjectivity is as good for PPTs as for other classes of adjectives and constructions. Finally, I deal with some complications that this view poses, and try to convince the audience that this is still a more explanatory and intuitive way to look at the issue.
REFERENCES